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THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT FINDS ARTICLE III 
STANDING BASED ON THE RISK OF FUTURE IDENTITY THEFT IN IN 
RE U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT DATA SECURITY 
BREACH LITIGATION 
BRIANA L. BORGOLINI* 
“The Internet has brought incredible opportunity, incredible wealth.  It 
gives us access to data and information that are enhancing our lives in all 
sorts of ways.  It also means that more and more of our lives are being 
downloaded, being stored, and as a consequence are a lot more vulnera-
ble.”1 
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO DATA BREACH LITIGATION 
The effects of identity theft can haunt data breach victims for years.2  Some 
victims report the need to constantly shut down fraudulent accounts.3  Likewise, 
some report countless fraudulent inquiries on their credit reports.4  Some victims 
even report fraudulent tax returns filed in their names.5  Many consumers believe 
there is not much they can do to protect their data in the first place.6 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, Villanova Charles Widger School of Law; B.A. 2014, Brown Univer-
sity.  This Note is dedicated to my parents, Caren and Ron Borgolini, who have never stopped 
believing in me.  I would additionally like to sincerely thank all members of the Villanova Law Review 
who provided thoughtful and invaluable feedback throughout the publication process. 
1. Barack Obama, President, United States of America, Remarks by the President on the 
Cybersecurity National Action Plan (Feb. 17, 2016) in WHITE HOUSE PRESIDENT BARACK 
OBAMA, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/17/remarks-presi-
dent-cybersecurity-national-action-plan [https://perma.cc/47JY-YUJ4]. 
2. See Tiffany Hsu, Data Breach Victims Talk of Initial Terror, Then Vigilance, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/09/business/equifax-data-breach-identity-theft-
victims.html [https://perma.cc/H2QM-HQYA]. 
3. See Anna Bahney, Identity Theft Nightmares: ‘I’ve Spent My Lifetime Building up My Credit’, CNN 
MONEY (Sept. 29, 2017, 11:11 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/29/pf/identity-theft/in-
dex.html [https://perma.cc/9MNK-699X]. 
4. See Laura Shin, ‘Someone Had Taken Over My Life’: An Identity Theft Victim’s Story, FORBES 
(Nov. 18, 2014, 9:18 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2014/11/18/someone-had-
taken-over-my-life-an-identity-theft-victims-story/#33fc234e25be [https://perma.cc/B5XM-
NZAV]. 
5. See Hsu, supra note 2. 
6. See id. (noting many consumers are not optimistic about amount of control retained over 
personal information). 
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In recent years, data breach occurrences have increased dramatically.7  Esti-
mates show around 2.5 billion consumers were impacted by a data breach in 2018.8  
The increasing use of technology and constantly improving skills of hackers has 
contributed to the prevalence of recent data breaches.9  Additionally, data breaches 
can compromise a wide variety of private information.10  The FBI’s Internet Crime 
Complaint Center reported that cybercrime caused “$2.7 billion in financial losses 
in 2018.”11  This marked increase in cyberattacks resulted in more data breach litiga-
tion.12 
One challenge victims of data breaches face when seeking legal relief is satisfy-
ing the Article III standing requirements.13  Meeting Article III standing 
 
7. Jon R. Knight, The New Normal: Easier Data Breach Standing Is Here to Stay, CYBERSECURITY 
L. REP. 1 (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.bsfllp.com/images/content/3/4/v4/3403/2019-02-06-
The-New-Normal-Easier-Data-Breach-Standing-Is-Here-to.pdf [https://perma.cc/QXZ8-JEH3] 
(explaining data breaches are becoming increasingly common); see also Aaron Holmes, The Biggest 
Hacks of 2019 So Far, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/biggest-
hacks-and-data-breaches-of-2019-capital-one-whatsapp-iphone-2019-9 [https://perma.cc/S9XH-
MUFF] (noting large numbers of unprecedented cyberattacks have occurred in only nine months 
of 2019); Paige Leskin, The 21 Scariest Data Breaches of 2018, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 30, 2018), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/data-hacks-breaches-biggest-of-2018-2018-12 
[https://perma.cc/67TG-BVZJ] (listing and discussing most impactful data breaches in 2018).  
Most of the attacks that occurred in the first nine months of 2019 appear to be financially moti-
vated.  See Holmes, supra. 
8. See Knight, supra note 7 (explaining data breaches’ impact on public). 
9. See Andrew Rossow, Why Data Breaches Are Becoming More Frequent and What You Need to Do, 
FORBES (May 23, 2018, 3:12 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewrossow 
/2018/05/23/why-data-breaches-are-becoming-more-frequent-and-what-you-need-to-
do/#1ddb4931d97f [https://perma.cc/7ULD-TFKH] (exploring reasons for recent increases in 
data breaches). 
10. See id.; see also Nathan Bomey, What Does Equifax’s $700M Settlement over Its Data Breach 
Mean for You?, USA TODAY (July 22, 2019, 7:50 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/ 
money/2019/07/22/ftc-equifax-settlement/1793029001/ [https://perma.cc/GB68-RRF2] (not-
ing Equifax’s 2017 data breach exposed wide range of personal information); Selena Larson, Every 
Single Yahoo Account Was Hacked—3 Billion in All, CNN MONEY (Oct. 4, 2017, 6:36 AM), 
https://money.cnn.com/2017/10/03/technology/business/yahoo-breach-3-billion-accounts/in-
dex.html [https://perma.cc/X6XN-G2DY] (detailing variety of information compromised for all 
Yahoo users). 
11. Report Shows Cyber-Enabled Crimes and Costs Rose in 2018, FBI (Apr. 22, 2019), 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/ic3-releases-2018-internet-crime-report-042219 
[https://perma.cc/7W65-NQ79] (explaining impact of cybercrimes in general).  The FBI receives 
more than 900 complaints of cybercrime each day; data breaches are among the most frequently 
reported.  Id. 
12. See, e.g., David Balser, Phyllis Sumner, Stewart Haskins & John Toro, Insight: Data Breach 
Litigation Trends to Watch, BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 4, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/pri-
vacy-and-data-security/insight-data-breach-litigation-trends-to-watch [https://perma.cc/4JUA-
5PD6] (observing data breach litigation will increase as data breaches increase); Joseph J. Lazzorotti, 
Jason C. Gavejian & Maya Atrakchi, Fourth Circuit Weighs in on Standing in Data Breach Litigation, 
JACKSON LEWIS (July 2, 2018), https://www.workplaceprivacyreport.com/2018/07/articles/con-
sumer-privacy/fourth-circuit-weighs-in-on-standing-in-data-breach-litigation/ 
[https://perma.cc/9W9P-VGY8] (noting increases in cyber incidents have also led to increases in 
data breach litigation). 
13. See generally Patrick J. Lorio, Note, Access Denied: Data Breach Litigation, Article III Standing, 
and a Proposed Statutory Solution, 51 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 79, 103–04 (2017) (explaining what 
plaintiffs must establish to show standing).  Plaintiffs must show Article III standing to bring their 
claim in federal court.  Id. at 82. 
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requirements is crucial for plaintiffs in data breach cases because many plaintiffs 
bring these claims as class actions, which are often brought in federal court.14  Ad-
ditionally, when plaintiffs sue in state court, the defendants often remove the action 
to federal court.15  The Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins16 has led to 
an increase in courts recognizing injury in data breach cases.17  These holdings allow 
more victims of data breaches to meet standing requirements and bring claims 
against the organizations responsible for protecting their data.18  A circuit split nev-
ertheless exists, and some circuits refuse to recognize the risk of future identity theft 
as an Article III injury.19  The split centers around whether the plaintiff can show 
injury simply by alleging that a breach puts them at increased risk of fraud.20  Ac-
cording to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia’s holding in In re 
U.S. Office of Personnel Management Data Security Breach Litigation (In re OPM Litigation),21 
circuits continue to find standing where plaintiffs merely allege an increased risk of 
future fraud.22  The Supreme Court has not yet addressed this issue, leaving one’s 
right to bring data breach claims based on the risk of future identity theft dependent 
upon jurisdiction.23 
This Note argues the District of Columbia Circuit’s decision in In re OPM Liti-
gation is consistent with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Article III standing 
requirements and the Court’s precedent because an increased risk of identity theft is 
 
14. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 794 F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting plaintiffs 
sued as a class); see also In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 765 (8th Cir. 2017) (explaining that 
plaintiffs filed as a class).  Further, the Class Action Fairness Act passed in 2005 resulted in a dra-
matic increase in state law class actions being litigated in federal court.  See Jay Tidmarsh, Finding 
Room for State Class Actions in a Post-CAFA World: The Case of the Counterclaim Class Action, 35 W. ST. 
U. L. REV. 193, 195 (2007); see also Lorio, supra note 13, at 82 n.16 (explaining some reasons data 
breach cases are typically brought in federal court). 
15. See, e.g., Khan v. Children’s Nat’l Health Sys., 188 F. Supp. 3d 524, 527 (D. Md. 2016) 
(noting defendants removed case to federal court); see also Lorio, supra note 13, at 82 n.16 (explaining 
reasons class actions are often in federal court). 
16. 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). 
17. See Knight, supra note 7 (noting courts increasingly find standing in data breach litigation 
when claimed injury is increased risk of future identity theft). 
18. See id. (explaining post-Spokeo, Inc. impact on data breach plaintiffs). 
19. See Luke Martin, Resolving the Circuit Split on Article III Standing for Data Breach Suits, COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. (Aug. 13, 2019), https://journals.library.columbia.edu/in-
dex.php/CBLR/announcement/view/181 [https://perma.cc/35GE-87Z2] (explaining D.C., 
Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits allow standing in cases where no misappropri-
ation had occurred yet while Second, Fourth and Eighth Circuits do not). 
20. See Martin, supra note 19 (explaining split in interpretation on whether a data breach alone 
may constitute injury). 
21. 928 F.3d 42 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
22. See id. at 59 (holding plaintiffs have adequately alleged injury sufficient for standing be-
cause they have shown a risk of future identity theft).  The court rejected arguments that the risk 
of future injury was too speculative, that the passage of time reduced certainty of future injury, and 
that the nature of the database being hacked made it less likely the motivation for the attack was 
financial gain.  See id. at 56, 59. 
23. See Alison Frankel, D.C. Judge: No Actual Damages, No Claims for Data Breach Victims, 
REUTERS (Feb. 4, 2019, 3:05 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-otc-data-breach/dc-
judge-no-actual-damages-no-claims-for-data-breach-victims-idUSKCN1PT23W 
[https://perma.cc/D22C-7KQB] (noting only some circuits allow plaintiffs to sue when infor-
mation has been compromised). 
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a sufficient injury to confer standing.24  Finding standing in cases involving data 
breaches is necessary to hold companies accountable for their role in data breaches.25  
Further, a statutory solution will not be sufficient to remedy data breach plaintiffs’ 
barrier to courts.26  Part II discusses Article III standing and the current circuit split 
over in data breach cases.  Part III sets forth the facts of In re OPM Litigation.  Part 
IV explains the reasoning for the District of Columbia Circuit’s decision.  Part V 
argues that it is consistent with Supreme Court precedent, that such a holding is 
necessary to incentivize companies to improve practices, and that a statutory solu-
tion will not be enough to confer standing.  Finally, Part VI explores this decision’s 
impact on data breach litigation. 
II. THE BACKGROUND OF DATA BREACH LITIGATION 
Data breaches occur at a high rate in part because of the frequent use of elec-
tronic storage methods to maintain data.27  In 2018 alone, data breaches impacted 
billions of people.28  Unsurprisingly, the number of lawsuits brought by victims of 
such breaches is also increasing, leading to constant development in data breach 
litigation.29  Data breach litigation, however, is often restricted by the Article III 
standing doctrine.30  The Supreme Court has not yet resolved the inconsistency 
among circuits.31 
 
24. For further discussion of Supreme Court precedent and data breach standing, see infra 
Section V.A. 
25. See Clara Kim, Note, Granting Standing in Data Breach Cases: The Seventh Circuit Paves the Way 
Towards a Solution to the Increasingly Pervasive Data Breach Problem, 2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 544, 575-
76, 581 (explaining how increased recognition of standing in data breach cases will hold companies 
accountable). 
26. See Megan Dowty, Note, Life is Short.  Go to Court: Establishing Article III Standing in Data 
Breach Cases, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 683, 697, 700 (2017) (noting injury will often still be required when 
there is violation of statute). 
27. See Andrew Braunstein, Note, Standing up for Their Data: Recognizing the True Nature of Injuries 
in Data Breach Claims to Afford Plaintiffs Article III Standing, 24 J.L. & POL’Y 93, 103 (2016) (noting 
continued movement towards electronic storage is one reason for increasing occurrence of data 
breaches). 
28. See Mike Snider, Your Data Was Probably Stolen in a Cyberattack in 2018—and You Should 
Care, USA TODAY (Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2018/12/28/data-
breaches-2018-billions-hit-growing-number-cyberattacks/2413411002/ [https://perma.cc/YX58-
Z4VB]. 
29. See Miles L. Galbraith, Comment, Identity Crisis: Seeking A Unified Approach to Plaintiff Stand-
ing for Data Security Breaches of Sensitive Personal Information, 62 AM. U.L. REV. 1365, 1374 (2013) (ex-
plaining data breach litigation is rapidly developing).  For further discussion of background on data 
breaches and litigation, see infra Section II.A. 
30. See Nicholas Green, Note, Standing in the Future: The Case for a Substantial Risk Theory of 
“Injury in Fact” in Consumer Data Breach Class Actions, 58 B.C. L. REV. 287, 288 (2017) (noting injury 
in fact element of standing makes it difficult for plaintiffs to bring claims).  For further discussion 
of standing doctrine, see infra Section II.B. 
31. See Frankel, supra note 23 (noting Supreme Court has yet to examine issue of standing in 
data breach cases); see also Lorio, supra note 13, at 91–101 (explaining circuit court standing out-
comes in data breach litigation).  For further discussion of the Supreme Court’s interpretations of 
the standing doctrine, see infra Section II.C (discussing recent Supreme Court standing decisions 
informing analysis in data breach cases).  For further discussion of the current circuit split, see infra 
Section II.D (discussing current circuit split regarding when data breach plaintiffs have shown suf-
ficient injury for Article III standing). 
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A. The Impact of Data Breaches 
Data breaches have become common because of the increase in electronic in-
formation storage.32  Hackers have an easier time accessing electronically stored in-
formation, increasing the risk consumers face.33  Estimates show that data breaches 
impact a high percentage of major organizations.34 
The type of information stolen typically informs the nature of the harm to the 
consumer.35  Harms may range from needing to cancel a credit card to having one’s 
credit history ruined.36  These variable harms are often what victims bring to litiga-
tion.37  Regardless of the precise harm, consumers primarily feel the negative effects 
of poor data management practices.38 
The lack of federal laws governing the duties of organizations that store sensi-
tive data makes obtaining a legal remedy difficult.39  Rather than being guided by a 
comprehensive framework, liability in data breaches is covered by a “patchwork of 
laws” that often address specific issues and not data breach litigation as a whole.40  
Under state and federal laws, liability is not imposed automatically when a breach 
 
32. See Braunstein, supra note 27, at 103–04 (noting increase in electronic storage of infor-
mation); Galbraith, supra note 29, at 1373–74 (explaining issues raised by data breach litigation are 
modern, as a result of the increase in technology use); see also Daniel Funke, By the Numbers: How 
Common Are Data Breaches—and What Can You Do About Them?, POLITIFACT (Sept. 23, 2019, 9:46 
AM), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2019/sep/23/numbers-how-common-
are-data-breaches-and-what-can-/ [https://perma.cc/5NXC-45EG] (noting increasingly common 
occurrence of data breaches since 2005). 
33. See Braunstein, supra note 27, at 104 (noting impact increased technology has on consum-
ers and susceptibility to being victims of data breaches). 
34. Aaron Wynhausen, Note, The Eight Circuit Further Complicates Plaintiff Standing in Data 
Breach Cases, 84 MO. L. REV. 297, 298 (2019) (citing Galbraith, supra note 29, at 1368) (noting fre-
quency at which large companies are impacted by data breaches or cyberattacks). 
35. See Green, supra note 30, at 290 (explaining impact and possible injuries that data breaches 
can have on consumers); see also Wynhausen, supra note 34 at 297. 
36. See Green, supra note 30, at 290. 
37. See id. 
38. See Braunstein, supra note 27, at 105 (explaining how “consumers bear the brunt of the 
harm” when a data breach occurs). 
39. See Wynhausen, supra note 34, at 298 (explaining current difficulties plaintiffs face in seek-
ing legal recourse after their information has been compromised); see also Kim, supra note 25, at 550 
(noting lack of appropriate legal recourse in response to increasing occurrence of data breaches). 
40. See Kim, supra note 25, at 554 (explaining current state of data breach regulatory scheme 
is not comprehensive and is more confusing than helpful).  State and federal agencies make these 
laws, which vary in what they address.  See id. at 551.  Further, many federal legal schemes in place 
are not effective at serving affected consumers because they address narrow issues within specific 
industries.  See id. at 554. 
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occurs.41  Rather, plaintiffs must satisfy certain requirements for the organization to 
be held liable.42 
B. The Interpretation of Article III Standing Requirements 
The Constitution states that only “cases” and “controversies” may be heard in 
federal court.43  However, the Supreme Court has interpreted the “cases” and “con-
troversies” language to mean that only plaintiffs who have standing may be heard in 
federal court.44  Article III therefore restricts federal court jurisdiction to “cases” 
and “controversies.”45  To satisfy Article III standing, the Supreme Court requires 
plaintiffs to show they suffered an injury.46  Federal courts must dismiss the case and 
cannot consider the merits of a plaintiff’s claim where there is no injury sufficient 
for standing.47 
The standing requirement is grounded in the constitutional principles that ad-
visory opinions are forbidden and the federal courts should not exceed their consti-
tutional limits.48  Besides limiting the role of federal courts, the standing requirement 
serves other purposes.49  First, the doctrine guarantees that a decision will primarily 
impact plaintiffs, therefore preventing claims that may be brought by “concerned 
bystanders.”50  In addition, the doctrine minimizes the litigation of “abstract injuries 
 
41. Who Is Liable When a Data Breach Occurs?, THOMSON REUTERS, https://legal.thomson-
reuters.com/en/insights/articles/data-breach-liability [https://perma.cc/8LLQ-SK7N] (last vis-
ited Sept. 12, 2019) (explaining when a company or organization may be held liable for a data breach 
under current legal framework); see also Usama Kahf, Is There Automatic Civil Liability for a Data 
Breach?, FISHER PHILLIPS (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.fisherphillips.com/Employment-Privacy-
Blog/is-there-automatic-civil-liability-for-data-breach [https://perma.cc/JL72-F3RR] (describing 
instances where a company or organization may be liable for data breach harms and explaining 
liability is not automatic). 
42. See Who Is Liable When a Data Breach Occurs?, supra note 41 (explaining specific require-
ments that must be found before liability may be imposed). 
43. See Bradford C. Mank, Data Breaches, Identity Theft, and Article III Standing: Will the Supreme 
Court Resolve the Split in the Circuits?, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1323, 1328–29 (2017) (explaining 
how Supreme Court came to require standing for plaintiffs bringing suit in federal court); see also 
Galbraith, supra note 29, at 1375 (noting Supreme Court has inferred standing requirements from 
text of Constitution). 
44. See Mank, supra note 43, at 1328–29 (detailing Article III’s limitation on judiciary). 
45. See Lorio, supra note 13, at 83 (discussing justiciability requirements and explaining certain 
requirements must be met before one can bring claim in federal court). 
46. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).  Article III standing require-
ments ensure the judiciary hears only cases that fall within its constitutional authority.  See id. at 560. 
47. See Galbraith, supra note 29, at 1376 (explaining restrictions imposed on federal courts 
regarding which cases they may hear). 
48. See Mank, supra note 43, at 1329 (explaining requirement of Article III standing and not-
ing why requirement is important).  The article also notes that it is important to ensure federal 
courts have a “properly limited [] role” in a democracy.  Id. (quoting Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. 
Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (explaining the limited role of federal courts)). 
49. See Galbraith, supra note 29, at 1386 (noting recent standing doctrine application to data 
breach claims fails to further justiciability principles). 
50. See id. at 1385–86 (quoting U.S. v. Students Challenging Reg. Agency Procedures 
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)).  “[T]he Court has said: ‘[t]he exercise of judicial power, which 
can so profoundly affect the lives, liberty, and property of those to whom it extends, is therefore 
restricted to litigants who can show “injury in fact” resulting from the action which they seek to 
have the court adjudicate.’”  Id. (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation 
of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982). 
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such as violations of generalized rights . . . .”51  Injury in fact is the element of stand-
ing most often at issue in data breach cases.52 
Plaintiffs in data breach cases often struggle to show Article III standing re-
quirements under Supreme Court jurisprudence.53  To satisfy Article III standing, 
plaintiffs must allege an injury that is “concrete and particularized[,] and . . . actual 
and imminent.”54  In data breach cases, plaintiffs often struggle to show injury—
especially when their information has yet to be misappropriated.55  The Supreme 
Court has not decided the issue of Article III standing in data breach cases, but it 
has analyzed other future injuries that are applicable to data breach litigation.56 
First, the Court has recognized that future injuries must be “actual or immi-
nent” to satisfy the injury requirement for standing.57  In 2013, the Supreme Court 
decided Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA58 and held an “objectively reasonable likeli-
hood” of future injury could not meet the elements of standing.59  In Clapper, the 
plaintiffs asserted two theories of injury, mirroring the arguments often made by 
plaintiffs in data breach cases.60  In rejecting the plaintiffs’ theories, the Court rea-
soned that any risk of future injury must be “certainly impending” to be sufficient 
 
51. Id. at 1386.  The Supreme Court will not hear cases concerning “the generalized interest 
of all citizens.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 483). 
52. See Lorio, supra note 13, at 84 (explaining injury is standing element that is difficult for 
data breach litigants to prove); see also Wynhausen, supra note 34, at 305 (noting standing is typically 
“major hurdle” plaintiffs must conquer). 
53. See Lorio, supra note 13, at 81–82 (noting many courts will not find standing in data breach 
cases); Kim, supra note 25, at 557 (noting data breach plaintiffs often cannot sufficiently allege 
standing). 
54. Priscilla Fasoro & Lauren Wiseman, Standing Issues in Data Breach Litigation: An Overview, 
INSIDE PRIVACY (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.insideprivacy.com/data-security/data-
breaches/standing-issues-in-data-breach-litigation-an-overview/ [https://perma.cc/8E5J-2VLK]. 
55. See Fasoro & Wiseman, supra note 54 (noting in data breach cases, standing elements are 
often harder to meet given unique injuries at issue). 
56. See Section II.C (discussing Supreme Court precedent relating to data breach cases). 
57. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (quoting Monsanto Co. v. 
Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010)); see also Lorio, supra note 13, at 84-86 (detailing 
Clapper’s impact on “actual or imminent” element of Article III injury). 
58. 568 U.S. 398 (2013). 
59. See id. at 410, 416 (finding risk of future harm is hypothetical and plaintiffs cannot create 
an injury by spending money seeking to avoid hypothetical future harm).  The Court noted such a 
claim “improperly waters down the fundamental requirements of Article III.”  Id. at 416. 
60. See id. at 407 (explaining arguments set forth by plaintiffs in support of satisfaction of 
Article III standing elements).  First, they alleged an “objectively reasonable likelihood” that injury 
would occur based on a likelihood that improper surveillance will eventually intercept their data.  
Id.  Next, they alleged that they incurred costs to prevent or reduce their risk of future injury.  Id.  
Plaintiffs in Clapper alleged a risk of future harm when they argued they would need to “take costly 
and burdensome measures” to mitigate risks.  See id. at 402.  In data breach cases, plaintiffs often 
allege risk of future injuries and a need to mitigate risks imposed on them by the data breach.  See 
Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 386–87 (6th Cir. 2016) (noting plaintiffs 
argue future risk of identity theft and expenses incurred to reduce future risk); In re Adobe Sys. 
Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1211, 1216 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (explaining plaintiffs alleged both 
an increased risk of future misappropriation and reasonable costs to mitigate risk). 
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for injury in fact.61  Practitioners and courts view this holding as inhibiting plaintiffs’ 
ability to meet standing requirements.62  
Later, the Court held in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins63 that a risk of future injury may 
satisfy the “concreteness” requirement of standing.64  Similar to the injury raised in 
many data breach cases, the plaintiff in Spokeo alleged they suffered an intangible 
injury as opposed to tangible.65  In assessing whether the injury was sufficiently con-
crete, the Court noted that the injury must be “real” rather than “abstract,” and 
intangible harm must be considered in light of “both history and the judgment of 
Congress.”66  The Court also noted that a procedural violation of a statute alone is 
insufficient to show concrete injury.67  In discussing the risk of future injury, the 
Court recognized the risk of real harm can sometimes satisfy the concreteness re-
quirement where the plaintiff can allege that Congress intended to remedy their par-
ticular harm.68  Despite these recent holdings, circuit courts remain split on the issue 
facing data breach plaintiffs, leaving victims with inconsistent remedies across cir-
cuits.69 
C. Circuit Courts’ Examination of Article III Standing in Data Breach Cases 
The circuit courts remain split over whether the increased risk of future identity 
theft is sufficient to show injury required for standing.70  While a number of courts 
have allowed such cases to proceed, some still refuse to expand the scope of Article 
 
61. See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 422 (holding plaintiffs’ speculative allegations and standing theory 
not sufficient to show injury). 
62. See Claire Wilka, Note, The Effects of Clapper v. Amnesty International USA: An Improper 
Tightening of the Requirement for Article III Standing in Medical Data Breach Litigation, 49 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 467, 470–71 (2016) (explaining Clapper’s effect on plaintiffs’ ability to bring claims); see also 
Arthur R. Vorbrodt, Note, Clapper Dethroned: Imminent Injury and Standing for Data Breach Lawsuits in 
Light of Ashley Madison, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 61, 87 (2016) (noting Clapper has been 
interpreted to restrict who may establish Article III standing, and many courts have viewed this as 
raising bar in data breach cases specifically). 
63. 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). 
64. See id. at 1548–49 (discussing requirement that injury must be concrete to satisfy Article 
III standing elements); see also Lorio, supra note 13, at 87–89 (explaining how Supreme Court treated 
concreteness requirement of standing in Spokeo, Inc.). 
65. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1546, 1549.  Plaintiff alleged that at some time, an individual 
searched for plaintiff and found false information in the database run by Spokeo, Inc.  See id. at 
1546.  This is considered an intangible injury as opposed to tangible because it is not an injury like 
losing a job or income.  See Lorio, supra note 13, at 88–89 (noting examples of tangible injury). 
66. Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1548–49 (explaining what Court will consider when deciding 
whether claimed injury is sufficiently concrete).  Further, the Court noted that the “case-or-contro-
versy” requirement of the Constitution gave rise to the standing doctrine, and tradition should 
inform the inquiry of whether harm occurred.  Id. at 1549.  Finally, the Court explained that Con-
gress is “well positioned to identify intangible harms.”  Id. 
67. See id. at 1549. 
68. See id. (explaining what types of injuries may satisfy the concreteness requirement).  The 
Court noted there may be circumstances where a plaintiff can sufficiently show concrete injury by 
alleging a violation of a procedural right.  See id. 
69. See infra Section II.C (discussing circuit split and explaining various outcomes related to 
standing in data breach claims). 
70. See Martin, supra note 19 (explaining current circuit split regarding standing in data breach 
cases); see also Frankel, supra note 23 (noting current circuit split and impact on data breach litiga-
tion). 
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III standing to allow them to be heard.71  While the D.C., Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth 
circuits have allowed these claims to move forward with an alleged risk of future 
injury, the Second, Third, Fourth, and Eighth circuits have not.72  A number of cir-
cuit courts have found standing where plaintiffs allege an increased risk of identity 
theft.  In Attias v. CareFirst, Inc.,73 the court held the plaintiff established injury be-
cause information had already been compromised and there was no longer a hypo-
thetical risk of injury.74  In Krottner v. Starbucks Corp.,75 the Ninth Circuit found that 
stolen, unencrypted person information stored on a laptop created an increased risk 
of identity theft.76  The court asserted that this risk was credible.77 
Similarly, in Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc.,78 the Seventh Circuit found 
that, where customer financial information was compromised and consumers were 
at risk for future identity theft (and in fact, one did experience instances of fraudulent 
activity), injury requirements were met.79  The Seventh Circuit applied similar rea-
soning in Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC,80 finding that plaintiffs showed suf-
ficiently substantial risk of future harm to satisfy standing when customer 
 
71. See Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 274 (4th Cir. 2017) (refusing to recognize injury for 
an increased risk of identity theft); see also Lorio, supra note 13, at 91–101 (assessing circuit court’s 
various outcomes on standing and noting some do not recognize risk of future theft as injury). 
72. See, e.g., Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 628–29 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (finding injury 
where victims alleged hackers obtained all information necessary to steal the victim’s identity); Beck, 
848 F.3d at 274 (holding requirements for standing were not met when plaintiffs could not show 
that information was misused); In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 770–72 (8th Cir. 2017) (declin-
ing to find injury where information was stolen but not misused); Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 
689 F. App’x 89, 90 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding plaintiff did not show standing where their card was 
not charged and they did not show expenditures to prevent theft); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. 
Co., 663 Fed. App’x 384, 389 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding plaintiffs alleged standing where data was 
clearly in hands of nefarious criminals); Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 
967 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding plaintiffs showed standing where financial information was compro-
mised); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding plaintiffs 
had standing when private information was stolen from a customer database); Reilly v. Ceridian 
Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding any future injury was speculative and therefore in-
sufficient for Article III standing); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that when someone stole a computer containing sensitive information, plaintiff suffered 
real and increased risk of identity theft); see also Lorio, supra note 13, at 91–101 (detailing various 
circuit court outcomes in data breach standing analyses). 
73. 865 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
74. See id. at 628–29 (explaining why court in Attias found future harm was not uncertain).  
In reaching its holding, the court found it important that all information necessary for identity theft 
was compromised.  See id. 
75. 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010). 
76. See id. at 1143 (finding plaintiffs “alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm” 
when they alleged stolen laptops contained sensitive information). 
77. See id. (explaining holding of Ninth Circuit).  The court contrasted the risk of future fraud 
due to misuse of data on a stolen computer against a hypothetical risk of stealing the computer in 
the first place.  See id.  The court noted that the latter would be too speculative for standing because 
the risk of identity fraud based on the computer’s potential to be stolen would be too far removed.  
See id. 
78. 819 F.3d 963 (7th Cir. 2016). 
79. See id. at 967 (holding circumstances of case showed sufficiently imminent injury in fact 
to satisfy standing requirements).  Plaintiffs here also spent time and money in an effort to mitigate 
the effects of the breach through credit monitoring.  See id. 
80. 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015). 
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information was compromised due to a database breach.81  In Remijas, the court also 
noted that “Clapper does not . . . foreclose any use whatsoever of future injuries to 
support Article III standing.”82  Further, in Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Com-
pany,83 the Sixth Circuit found standing where private personal and financial infor-
mation was intentionally stolen and plaintiffs showed it would likely be used for 
fraudulent purposes.84 
In contrast, some circuits do not recognize such injuries as sufficient to consti-
tute standing.85  In Beck v. McDonald,86 the Fourth Circuit held that there was no 
injury where plaintiffs could not show that information contained on a stolen laptop 
was misused, or that the thief intended to misuse the information.87  Likewise, in 
Reilly v. Ceridian Corp.,88 the Third Circuit found that where allegations of a future 
injury required speculation, injury was not sufficiently imminent for the purposes of 
standing.89 
Moreover, the Eight Circuit in In re SuperValu, Inc.90 declined to recognize injury 
where plaintiffs’ information was compromised but no misuse occurred.91  Similarly, 
the Second Circuit refused to find injury in Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc.92 when plain-
tiff could not show they incurred losses, even where attempted identity theft oc-
curred.93  As a result, the holdings of district courts are similarly split, leaving plain-
tiffs’ abilities to bring their claims dependent on where they are located.94 
 
81. See id. at 693 (finding plaintiffs showed substantial enough risk of future harm to satisfy 
standing).  Further, the court emphasized that certain inferences could be drawn in situations such 
as the one at hand, asking the question: “Why else would hackers break into a . . . database and 
steal customers’ private information?  Presumably, the purpose of the hack is . . . to make fraudu-
lent charges or assume those consumers’ identities.”  Id. 
82. Id. 
83. 663 Fed. App’x 384 (6th Cir. 2016). 
84. See id. at 389 (noting where reasonable inference of malicious intent could be drawn, 
future injury could satisfy requirements of standing). 
85. See Lorio, supra note 13, at 91–101 (assessing circuit court’s various outcomes on standing 
and noting some do not recognize risk of future theft as injury). 
86. 848 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2017). 
87. See id. at 274 (finding plaintiffs did not allege sufficient injury when they could not show 
information was misused or at any risk of being misused). 
88. 664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011). 
89. See id. at 42 (holding alleged injuries were too remote for Article III standing). 
90. 870 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2017). 
91. See id. at 770–72 (explaining plaintiffs’ allegations of increased risk of future identity theft 
cannot satisfy standing).  The court noted that while some card information was stolen, identity 
theft was not a substantial risk because social security numbers were not stolen.  See id. at 770.  In 
contrast, the court did recognize injury for one plaintiff who could show he experienced actual 
identity theft.  See id. at 773. 
92. 689 F. App’x 89 (2d Cir. 2017). 
93. See id. at 90 (noting agreement with district court that plaintiff had not shown charges to 
their card, or expenditures monitoring her credit that could constitute injury). 
94. See, e.g., Oneal v. First Tenn. Bank, No. 4:17-CV-3-TAV-SKL, 2018 WL 1352519, at *1 
(E.D. Tenn. Mar. 15, 2018) (noting injury is not sufficiently concrete for standing where alleged 
injury is an unathorized credit inquiry that could lead to future harm); Fero v. Excellus Health Plan 
Inc., 304 F. Supp. 3d 333, 345 (W.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding future harm of identity theft was sufficient 
when circumstances suggested hackers likely intended to misappropriate information); Khan v. 
Children’s Nat’l Health Sys., 188 F. Supp. 3d 524, 532 (D. Md. 2016) (finding plaintiffs sufficiently 
allege injury where instances of theft occurred, or where they can show purpose of breach was 
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III. THE FACTS OF IN RE U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT DATA 
SECURITY BREACH LITIGATION 
The District of Columbia Circuit examined the standing issue in data breach 
cases in In re OPM Litigation.95  The U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is 
the main human resource agency of the federal government.96  The OPM electron-
ically stores personal information on federal employees as well as millions of indi-
viduals who submitted to federal background checks.97  In 2014, OPM experienced 
multiple cyberattacks that compromised the private information of nearly 21.5 mil-
lion people.98  The stolen information from the breach included “current and pro-
spective employees’ Social Security numbers, birth dates, and residency details, along 
with approximately 5.6 million sets of fingerprints.”99  The breach also compromised 
personal information about employees’ relatives.100 
 Affected individuals have since experienced varying types of financial fraud, 
and many as-of-yet unaffected individuals fear future identity theft.101  OPM offered 
some individuals free fraud monitoring, identity theft protection, and insurance for 
a period of time.102  Many people filed lawsuits against OPM and Keypoint, an in-
vestigation and security partner that handled many background checks for the fed-
eral government, after these measures did not rectify their fears.103 
Some plaintiffs alleged OPM had notice that its systems were “prime targets” 
for cyberattacks, and that KeyPoint failed to meet industry standards in maintaining 
OPM’s information security defenses.104  Plaintiffs further alleged hackers 
 
identity theft); In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1159 (D. 
Minn. 2014) (finding plaintiffs had alleged actual injury because a number of consumers experi-
enced instances of identity fraud such as unauthorized charges, compromised bank accounts, and 
other financial losses); see also Lorio, supra note 13, at 102–03 (providing examples of district court 
outcomes in data breach standing cases). 
95. See In re U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt. Data Sec. Breach Litig. (In re OPM Litig.), 928 F.3d 
42, 49, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (noting plaintiffs were exposed to a heightened risk of identity theft and 
district court improperly dismissed claim for lack of Article III standing); see also Attias v. CareFirst, 
Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 622 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (examining whether plaintiffs had standing after data 
breach). 
96. See In re OPM Litig., 928 F.3d at 49 (explaining role of OPM). 
97. See id. (illustrating scope of data possessed by OPM). 
98. See id. at 50 (explaining OPM experienced multiple cyberattacks between November 2013 
and November 2014).  Some of these attacks went unnoticed for months.  Id. 
99. See id. (showing range of information compromised by cyberattacks). 
100. See id. (explaining how data breaches impacted more than just federal employees). 
101. See id. (explaining cyberattack’s impact on those affected). 
102. See id. (describing steps OPM took to assist individuals impacted by breach). 
103. See id. (explaining plaintiffs sued because offered services failed to alleviate affected par-
ties’ concerns).  The Court split the suits into two complaints.  Id.  First, thirty-eight victims of the 
breach, along with a putative class, sued OPM.  Id.  Second, the National Treasury Employees 
Union sued for declaratory and injunctive relief.  Id.  This Note will focus on the first complaint. 
104. See id. at 51 (explaining basis for plaintiffs’ claim).  Plaintiffs asserted OPM experienced 
similar data breaches in the past and that their network experienced a “large number of hacking 
attempts.”  Id.  Plaintiffs alleged that OPM’s Inspector General reported weaknesses in OPM’s 
network protections.  See id.  Plaintiffs further alleged that “KeyPoint knew or should have known 
that its information security defenses did not reasonably or effectively protect Plaintiffs’ and Class 
members’ [personal information] and the credentials used to access it . . . .”  Id. (alteration in orig-
inal) (quoting Consolidated Amended Complaint at J.A. 98, In re OPM Litig., 928 F.3d at 51 (No. 
1:15-mc-01394)). 
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specifically targeted personal information for theft, noting that some plaintiffs had 
already experienced malicious use of their personal information.105  OPM and Key-
Point moved to dismiss the claims on Article III standing grounds.106  The district 
court declined to recognize an increased risk of future identity theft as sufficient to 
show standing and granted defendants’ motion to dismiss.107  On appeal, the District 
of Columbia Circuit held that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged injury in fact as 
required for Article III standing.108 
IV. A NARRATIVE ANALYSIS OF IN RE U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL 
MANAGEMENT DATA SECURITY BREACH LITIGATION 
In In re OPM Litigation, the D.C. Circuit assessed whether plaintiffs whose per-
sonal information was compromised but not yet used fraudulently had sufficient 
injury for Article III standing.109  While plaintiffs alleged numerous harms, the court 
focused on their increased risk of future identity theft, as all plaintiffs alleged that 
harm.110  The court began by identifying recent Supreme Court standing prece-
dent.111  It then examined the plaintiffs’ claims in light of its prior holding in Attias, 
where it found that plaintiffs’ substantial risk of future identity theft satisfied stand-
ing.112  Finally, the court rejected OPM’s argument that government breaches are 
motivated by interests other than fraud and distinguished the present case’s facts 
from those OPM cited.113 
A. The Court Assesses Supreme Court and Circuit Precedent 
The D.C. Circuit examined recent Supreme Court holdings to support its con-
clusion that plaintiffs’ increased risk of future identity theft satisfies Article III stand-
ing’s injury requirement.114  The court first noted that in Spokeo, Inc., the Supreme 
Court held that injury must be “concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, 
 
105. See id. at 52, 58 (explaining plaintiffs alleged attacks targeted their information for im-
proper use).  Plaintiffs alleged attackers misused their information through “improper use of their 
Social Security numbers, unauthorized charges to existing credit card and bank accounts, fraudulent 
openings of new credit card and other financial accounts, and the filing of fraudulent tax re-
turns . . . .”  Id. at 52. 
106. Id. at 53. 
107. Id. (noting district court granted OPM and KeyPoint’s motions to dismiss for lack of 
standing). 
108. Id. (reconsidering whether plaintiffs alleged sufficient injury in fact for standing). 
109. See id. (explaining District of Columbia Circuit reversed district court on Article III 
standing issue).  The circuit court held that “plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to satisfy Article 
III standing requirements.”  Id. 
110. See id. at 55 (explaining court focuses on risk of future identity theft as injury when 
conducting standing analysis). 
111. See id. at 54 (explaining current Supreme Court standards for injury in Article III stand-
ing).  For a further discussion of the court’s interpretation of Supreme Court standing precedent, 
see infra Section IV.A. 
112. See id. at 55–56 (comparing the current case’s facts to Attias holding).  For a further 
discussion of the court’s analysis of Attias, see infra Section IV.A. 
113. See id. at 56–58 (discussing and rejecting arguments made by OPM).  For a further dis-
cussion of the court’s analysis of OPM’s arguments, see infra Section IV.B. 
114. See id. at 54–55 (explaining how Supreme Court standards for Article III standing apply 
to present case). 
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not conjectural or hypothetical.”115  The court also pointed out that the Supreme 
Court had previously held claims of future injury must be “certainly impending” or 
indicate a “substantial risk” of an injury occurring.116  The court next examined the 
plaintiffs’ argument that the district court’s opinion was contrary to the circuit’s 
holding in Attias.117  It found that although the attacks were distinguishable from 
those in Attias in some ways, the OPM hackers still possessed all the information 
they needed for fraud like the hackers in Attias.118  Further, some plaintiffs in the 
present case had already experienced misappropriation, which illustrated the mali-
cious intent of the hackers.119  The court found that these facts were similar to those 
in Attias and sufficiently showed that the plaintiffs’ risk of future identity theft was 
substantial, rather than “merely speculative or theoretical.”120 
B. The Court Rejects OPM’s Arguments of Hacker Motivation and Distinguishes Prior 
Caselaw 
The court next examined OPM’s arguments: (1) unique hacker motivation for 
government systems cases, and (2) plaintiffs’ lack of standing.121  The D.C. Circuit 
ultimately rejected both theories.122  The court first rejected the arguments that the 
factors motivating hackers to breach a government system are different than those 
motivating hackers to breach other systems, noting that while there may be other 
motives for one to hack a government system, it is equally possible that the purpose 
is to steal identities.123  The court emphasized that the possibility of other motives 
does not negate the opportunity for identity theft.124 
Next, the court found that OPM’s cited cases, which held that the plaintiffs did 
not have injury sufficient for standing when they alleged a future risk of identity 
theft, were distinguishable from the present case.125  First, the court distinguished 
Beck, where stealing a laptop containing personal information compromised data 
because there was no evidence of misuse or intent to misuse the data, and the risk 
 
115. Id. at 54 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 
1540, 1548 (2016)) (noting standard for injury in fact set forth by Supreme Court in Spokeo, Inc.). 
116. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 
U.S. 149, 158 (2014)) (noting Supreme Court’s rule regarding future injury in standing cases). 
117. See id. at 55–56 (citing Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 622, 628–29 (D.C. Cir. 
2017) (examining circuit court’s prior opinion in Attias and applying to present case). 
118. See id. at 56 (comparing OPM and Attias attacks and determining that, in either case, 
attackers possess information to commit identity theft).  Further, the court noted that “[i]t hardly 
takes a criminal mastermind to imagine how such information could be used to commit identity 
theft.”  Id. 
119. See id. (explaining facts further allowed circuit court to conclude risk of future identity 
theft is substantial).  “[H]ackers stole Social Security numbers, birth dates, fingerprints, and ad-
dresses, among other sensitive personal information.”  Id. 
120. See id. (explaining plaintiffs in present case have alleged sufficient facts to show injury 
necessary for standing). 
121. See id. at 56–59. 
122. See id. at 56–59 (discussing and rejecting arguments made by defendant OPM). 
123. See id. at 57 (explaining why circuit court finds OPM’s argument regarding motive and 
intent unpersuasive).  The court disagreed with the dissent’s stance that other motives are more 
plausible in the case of an attack on a government database.  See id. 
124. See id. (explaining why OPM’s ulterior motive argument fails). 
125. See id. at 58 (finding facts of present case “differ markedly” from cases OPM cited). 
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of future harm remained speculative.126  Similarly, the court distinguished Reilly, 
where a hacker “potentially” accessed “personal and financial information” but fu-
ture harm was speculative because plaintiffs showed no evidence of misuse.127  In 
contrast to Beck and Reilly, the court noted that plaintiffs in this case alleged that 
hackers targeted their personal information specifically for identity fraud purposes, 
and used it for that purpose in some cases.128  Therefore, the substantial risk of 
future identity theft sufficed to show injury.129 
V. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IN RE U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 
DATA SECURITY BREACH LITIGATION 
Data breach victims should have injury sufficient for standing where they can 
allege an increased risk of future identity theft when their information is compro-
mised.  The increased risk of future identity theft is not speculative, is sufficiently 
concrete under Supreme Court jurisprudence, and finding standing allows entities 
to be held accountable for their role in data breaches, thereby incentivizing better 
protection.130  Further, a statutory solution or private right of action likely will not 
allow data breach plaintiffs to pursue the merits of their claims or a remedy because 
they would still need to show injury sufficient for Article III standing.131 
A. An Increased Risk of Future Identity Theft is Concrete Injury under Supreme Court 
Precedent 
Satisfying the standing elements, including injury, should be a “low threshold” 
and should not keep data breach victims out of court.132  Even if a narrow approach 
is taken following Clapper and Spokeo, Inc., allegations of a future risk of identity theft 
 
126. See id. at 58–59 (citing Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 274-75 (4th Cir. 2017)) (distin-
guishing allegations in present case from those in Beck). 
127. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 
40 (3d Cir. 2011)) (noting Reilly plaintiffs failed to establish concrete facts showing data was used 
for fraudulent purposes).  In Reilly, it was “not known whether the hacker read, copied, or under-
stood the data,” and no plaintiff alleged any misappropriation.  Id. (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting Reilly, 664 F.3d at 44). 
128. See id. at 58–59 (explaining  facts of current case differ from those cited by OPM).  These 
allegations serve to move the risk in this case from speculative to substantial.  See id. at 59. 
129. See id. at 59 (finding plaintiffs in case alleged facts that support possibility of a substantial 
risk of future identity theft). 
130. See Kim, supra note 25, at 581 (explaining how companies will be pressured to improve 
their practices when courts may examine the merits of victims’ claims); Martin, supra note 19 (noting 
that “[a]llowing plaintiffs to take advantage of the more relaxed standing requirements in those 
courts has the potential effect of pushing companies to invest in more comprehensive cybersecurity 
as a way to better protect against litigation risk and therefore better protect these consumers in the 
first place.”). 
131. See Dowty, supra note 26, at 697, 700 (2017)) (noting courts still require injury along with 
statutory violation).  For a further discussion of future risk of identity theft as sufficient for Article 
III standing purposes, see infra Section V.A. 
132. See Galbraith, supra note 29, at 1371 (explaining bar for establishing Article III standing 
should, in theory, be fairly low).  This article also explains that successful injunctive relief may 
signify a cognizable injury.  See id. 
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warrant a finding that the elements have been properly established.133  In cases where 
plaintiffs can allege a high risk of future identify theft, such as In re OPM Litigation, 
an attenuated chain of future events does not exist and therefore does not raise the 
issues the Supreme Court was concerned with in Clapper.134 
Plaintiffs in data breach cases may allege injury sufficient for standing based on 
their “substantial risk of future identity theft” and associated expenses necessary to 
reduce their risk.135  This finding is compatible with Clapper because many plaintiffs 
will have already experienced attempted or actual fraudulent activity, which gives 
rise to the inference that victims who have not been impacted yet are likely to be in 
the future.136  Importantly, this inference eliminates the possibility that a hypothetical 
chain of future events is required for injury to occur.137 
Further, plaintiffs in data breach cases can at times raise “concrete” injuries 
such as those the Court was concerned with in Spokeo, Inc., where plaintiffs raised 
instances of attempted fraud and losses of large amounts of financial information.138  
Data breach victims may raise a “risk of real harm” by alleging that they are at an 
increased risk to have their data stolen in the future.139  Although risk of harm is an 
“intangible” injury, the Court in Spokeo, Inc. specified that, when it held an injury 
 
133. For a further discussion of the alignment between the D.C. Circuit’s analysis and the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of Article III standing elements, see infra notes 135–42 and accom-
panying text. 
134. Compare In re OPM Litig., 928 F.3d at 59, 61 (finding standing where plaintiffs alleged an 
increased risk of future identity theft and spending on services to reduce risk of identity theft), with 
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 422 (2013) (finding no standing where plaintiffs allege 
risk of future injury because chain of inferences leading to injury was too speculative and depended 
on many unknown events). 
135. See In re OPM Litig., 928 F.3d at 59 (explaining expenses plaintiffs “reasonably incurred” 
to protect themselves is an injury because plaintiffs succeed in alleging a risk of future identity 
theft).  The court noted that “[t]he [Supreme] Court has recognized standing to sue on the basis of 
costs incurred to mitigate or avoid harm when a substantial risk of harm actually exists.”  Id. (second 
alteration in original) (quoting Hutton v. National Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, Inc., 892 F.3d 
613, 622 (4th Cir. 2018)); see also Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414 n.5 (outlining standard for Article III 
standing requirements if plaintiffs choose to mitigate potential harm). 
136. See In re OPM Litig., 928 F.3d at 56 (explaining because some information has already 
been used fraudulently, it can be inferred that others are at increased risk). 
137. See id. (noting some plaintiffs have already alleged incidents of fraudulent activity as a 
result of information being compromised).  The circuit court inferred from these facts that the risk 
of future identity theft is no longer speculative, but is substantial.  See id.  This substantial risk is 
distinguishable from Clapper because the Clapper plaintiffs showed only hypothetical harm and no 
inference of future injury existed.  See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 410 (finding no injury where plaintiffs 
allege risk of future injury because chain of inferences leading to injury was too speculative and 
depended on many unknown events). 
138. See In re OPM Litig., 928 F.3d at 56 (explaining nature and extent of information com-
promised, which makes it substantially likely plaintiffs would be harmed in future); see also Spokeo, 
Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1546 (2016) (describing facts of case and noting injury needs to come 
from risk of real harm besides procedural violation); Lorio, supra note 13, at 88 (noting plaintiff’s 
allegation that incorrect information about him was provided in a search). 
139. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (emphasis added) (explaining sometimes plaintiff’s 
risk of intangible harm may qualify as sufficient for Article III standing); see also In re OPM Litig., 
928 F.3d at 55–56 (explaining types of future injuries plaintiffs allege and exploring support for 
them). 
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must be “concrete,” it did not intend to require them to be “tangible.”140  For ex-
ample, data breach plaintiffs may allege specific instances of misuse that have already 
occurred.141  Unlike the plaintiffs in Spokeo, Inc., this fact helps plaintiffs with data 
breach claims to illustrate their risk of real harm is substantial.142 
In data breach cases such as In re OPM Litigation, the risk at issue is one that 
Congress intended to remedy.143  In recent years, Congress has shown that it intends 
organizations to be held accountable for their roles in data breaches, as evidenced 
by the representatives’ comments proposed legislation.144  Therefore, the findings 
of the D.C. Circuit further align with the Supreme Court’s holding in Spokeo, Inc. 
because the court recognizes data breach victims’ risk of real harm as one Congress 
intends to remedy.145  While there is no comprehensive framework for finding lia-
bility in data breach cases, there are statutes and regulations that apply to certain 
facets of data breach issues.146  This illustrates Congress’s intent to provide some 
remedies to those impacted by breaches.147 
 
140. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (explaining what “concrete” injury may consist of in 
order to sufficiently meet elements of Article III standing, and acknowledging intangible harm may, 
at times, be “concrete”); see also Lorio, supra note 13, at 88–89 (discussing Supreme Court’s reason-
ing as to what constitutes “concrete”). 
141. See In re OPM Litig., 928 F.3d at 56 (explaining there were already instances of misuse of 
some plaintiffs’ information, including unauthorized accounts and false tax returns, and noting this 
fact was sufficient to give rise to inference that others would likely experience fraud and misuse). 
142. Compare id. at 56 (explaining nature of plaintiffs’ alleged injuries and specific harms that 
have occurred), with Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1544–46 (discussing plaintiff’s allegations of injury 
and questioning whether any harm occurred besides a procedural violation). 
143. See Taryn Elliott, Comment, Standing a Chance: Does Spokeo Preclude Claims Alleging the 
Violation of Certain State Data Breach Laws?, 49 SETON HALL L. REV. 233, 245–46 (2018) (describing 
recent comments by legislators and proposed legislation after data breaches shows Congress in-
tends to provide a remedy to affected plaintiffs); see also Kim, supra note 25, at 552–53 (noting 
various federal laws hold organizations accountable for data breaches). 
144. See Elliott, supra note 143, at 245 (explaining recent reactions to data breaches indicating 
Congress intends to impose remedy for data breaches).  In light of a recent Equifax breach, one 
senator noted that Equifax’s conduct was “outrageous.”  See id. (quoting Press Release, Sen. Bob 
Menendez, What You Should Know About Equifax Data Breach (Sept. 14, 2017)).  Further, a 
member of the House of Representatives commented that Equifax should have been ready to re-
spond to the breach immediately.  See id.  Additionally, the article notes there have been many 
efforts to enact a federal statute regulating data breaches, such as the proposed Personal Data No-
tification and Protection Act.  See id. 
145. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1549–50 (holding where there is “risk of real harm,” “con-
creteness” may be satisfied if plaintiffs can show their harm is one Congress intends to remedy). 
146. See Kim, supra note 25, at 551–53 (discussing lack of a consumer-oriented federal frame-
work for data breach litigation and how lack of framework impacts cases); see also Elliott, supra note 
143, at 245 (describing reactions from federal legislators to lack of overarching federal legal remedy 
for data breaches). 
147. See Elliott, supra note 143, at 245 (discussing facts showing congressional intent to hold 
organization accountable for role in data breaches).  For a further discussion of these indicators of 
congressional intent, see supra Section V.A. 
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B. Plaintiffs’ Claims Must be Recognized to Hold Companies Accountable for Data Breaches  
If a federal court finds that the plaintiff does not have standing, it must dismiss 
the case immediately.148  As a result, the court will not hear the merits of the claim.149  
This means the legal issue that the plaintiff alleges will not be decided.150  Under the 
ruling from In re OPM Litigation, an organization that was subject to a data breach 
may be held liable and plaintiffs’ claim may be assessed on the merits.151  Plaintiffs 
sought redress due to a failure to conform to industry standards and failure to ade-
quately protect security credentials.152  The court found the plaintiffs had sufficient 
standing and, as a result, the case was remanded to be heard on its merits and po-
tentially hold the OPM accountable.153 
Organizations and companies are far less likely to be held accountable for their 
roles in data breaches if lawsuits where an increased risk of future identity theft is 
the only injury alleged are dismissed before court reaches the merits.154  Plaintiffs in 
data breach cases bring claims under a variety of theories, including “‘negligence, 
breach of contract, unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, unfair and deceptive 
business practices, invasion of privacy,’ and violations of various state and federal 
statutes.”155  Under these theories, entities can at times be held liable for their role 
in a data breach.156 
However, accountability under these theories can be imposed only if plaintiffs 
can surmount Article III standing requirements.157  Federal courts should recognize 
the increased risk of future identity theft as injury sufficient to satisfy the standing 
 
148. See Benjamin C. West, Note, No Harm, Still Foul: When an Injury-in-Fact Materializes in a 
Consumer Data Breach, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 701, 704 (2018) (explaining necessary Article III standing 
requirements in federal court cases).  Federal courts must dismiss cases when plaintiffs do not have 
standing to ensure that courts are properly within their limited role and do not provide advisory 
opinions.  See id. 
149. See Galbraith, supra note 29, at 1375–76 (explaining impact of case being dismissed due 
to lack of standing on merits of case); see also Emily Marcum, Comment, Corporate Liability for Data 
Breaches: Will Equifax Victims Have a Leg to Stand on?, 18 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & L. 525, 533 (2018) 
(noting court will not consider merits of case when plaintiff fails to meet all standing requirements). 
150. See Lorio, supra note 13, at 128 (explaining many courts do not reach merits of cases in 
data breach litigation unless plaintiff’s information has already been misappropriated). 
151. See In re U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 928 F.3d 42, 75 (D.C. Cir. 
2019) (holding plaintiffs sufficiently alleged standing and remanding case). 
152. See id. at 51 (discussing plaintiffs’ theories of OPM liability for data breach).  Plaintiffs 
allege that both OPM and KeyPoint should have been on notice that their security defenses were 
insufficient.  See id.  For a further discussion of Plaintiff’s theories of OPM liability for the data 
breach, see supra Part III. 
153. See id. at 75. 
154. See Marcum, supra note 149, at 555 (discussing how failing to view increased risk of 
identity theft as injury sufficient for Article III standing affects corporate liability). 
155. Wynhausen, supra note 34, at 307 (quoting Megan Dowty, Note, Life is Short. Go to Court: 
Establishing Article III Standing in Data Breach Cases, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 683, 686 (2017)) (noting legal 
theories plaintiffs have brought data breach claims under). 
156. See H. Dennis Beaver, What Is My Liability for a Data Breach?, KIPLINGER (June 19, 2019), 
https://www.kiplinger.com/article/business/T048-C032-S014-what-is-my-liability-for-a-data-
breach.html [https://perma.cc/Y4QM-A5HE] (discussing how civil liability for data breach can be 
imposed).  Courts can impose liability on an organization if it negligently protects stored infor-
mation or fails to sufficiently reduce harm and notify individuals after a security breach  See id. 
157. See Lorio, supra note 13, at 128 (explaining detrimental effects of dismissing a data breach 
claim at standing phase). 
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elements so there will be far more opportunities to examine organizations’ security 
practices.158  If courts fail to recognize standing in these situations, the risk stemming 
from the data breach primarily impacts consumers rather than the companies obli-
gated to protect their data.159  The holding of In re OPM Litigation continues to move 
the analysis in the right direction because it recognizes the range of injuries plaintiffs 
often face and allows courts to examine the merits of their claims.160  This holding 
is necessary, because movement in this direction can increase the risk of liability that 
entities face and incentivize them to better protect and manage personal infor-
mation.161 
C. Statutory Standing and Private Causes of Action Are Unlikely to Allow Plaintiffs to 
Reach the Merits of their Claims  
Conferring statutory standing is unlikely to provide plaintiffs with a way to hold 
companies accountable.  Article III requirements are a “hard floor” and Congress 
may not circumvent them entirely.162  The fact that a statute describes a right will 
not allow a plaintiff to sue in the absence of injury.163  The Supreme Court has 
 
158. See Marcum, supra note 149, at 533 (explaining plaintiffs must satisfy Article III standing 
requirements before liability can be imposed); Lorio, supra note 13, at 128 (acknowledging courts 
cannot hear merits unless standing is established); see also Kim, supra note 25, at 575–76, 581 (as-
serting that finding injury and allowing plaintiffs to proceed in more suits will lead to increased 
company accountability); Martin, supra note 19 (noting increased findings of standing may cause 
companies to better protect data to avoid litigation examining their practices). 
159. See Brandon Faulkner, Note, Hacking Into Data Breach Notification Laws, 59 FLA. L. REV. 
1097, 1100–01 (2007) (explaining how risk stemming from data breaches impacts consumers); see 
also Braunstein, supra note 27, at 105 (noting “consumers bear the brunt of the harm” after data 
breaches). 
160. See In re U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 928 F.3d 42, 50, 59–61 (D.C. 
Cir. 2019) (discussing various injuries plaintiffs alleged and holding injuries satisfied elements of 
Article III standing).  Plaintiffs alleged harms ranging from instances of fraud to costs incurred as 
an attempt to mitigate risks.  See id. at 50, 52.  In this case, plaintiffs’ claims were allowed to move 
forward so the court could examine whether OPM and Keypoint took reasonable steps to protect 
consumer data.  See id. at 75. 
161. See Michelle R. King, Note, Restricting the Corporate Practice of Medicine: Subverting ERISA 
to Hold Managed Care Organizations Accountable for Health Care Treatment Decisions—the Texas Initiative, 
23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1203, 1235–36 (1998) (noting adequate legal remedy to injured parties may 
increase accountability); see also Kim, supra note 25, at 575–76, 581 (explaining why increased finding 
of standing will incentivize better corporate practices); Martin, supra note 19 (noting “positive feed-
back loop” may occur if plaintiffs more often have standing).  Given that “2019 was the most 
expensive year on record” for data breaches, other motivators such as increased expense, loss of 
business, and poor media attention are not likely to incentivize businesses to improve their data 
protection methods.  See Isaac Kohen, Data Breaches and Security 2020: Five Steps SMBs Can Take to 
Protect Their Data, FORBES (Jan. 28, 2020, 8:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/theyec/2020/01/28/data-breaches-and-security-2020-five-steps-smbs-can-take-to-protect-
their-data/#78b7654d75f6 [https://perma.cc/Q84H-Q6C7] (discussing losses due to data 
breaches in 2019). 
162. See Dowty, supra note 26, at 697 (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 
497 (2009)) (describing Supreme Court jurisprudence finding Congress may not grant standing 
where plaintiff cannot show injury). 
163. See id.; Lorio, supra note 13, at 114. 
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recognized that standing requirements bind both Congress and federal courts.164  
Congressional legislation may authorize litigation by conferring standing within 
Article III’s confines.165  Nevertheless, litigants are required to show “a distinct and 
palpable injury to [themselves]” that the court can remedy.166  Congress may not 
direct federal courts to hear cases where Article III standing is not met.167 
Further, state data breach laws have not consistently conferred standing where 
plaintiffs could not meet Article III injury requirements.168  Even where there is a 
state data breach statute theoretically creating a cause of action, plaintiffs yield in-
consistent results in establishing standing.169  This inconsistency emphasizes the 
need for courts to recognize a risk of future identity theft as sufficient injury satisfy 
standing requirements.170 
Federal district courts in California have declined to confer standing—even 
where procedural violations of statutes were alleged—because plaintiffs did not es-
tablish that defendant’s violation of consumer protection statutes caused injury.171  
Similarly, federal district courts in Maryland have found a lack of standing in claims 
brought under the Maryland Consumer Protection Act and District of Columbia 
Consumer Protection Procedures Act because plaintiffs did not allege sufficient in-
jury—even in light of a statutory violation.172  Further, federal district courts in Ohio 
have failed to confer standing on plaintiffs alleging violations of the Fair Credit Re-
porting Act because they did not allege an injury other than a statutory violation.173  
The dispositive issue in establishing standing in data breach cases is whether the 
court will recognize plaintiffs’ increased risk of future theft as a sufficiently imminent 
injury under Article III, and not whether a statute confers standing in its text.174  
Therefore, a statutory cause of action alone will not confer standing on plaintiffs in 
 
164. See John G. Roberts, Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1226 
(1993) (illustrating impact constitutional limitations have on branches of government).  “Neither 
the Administrative Procedure Act, nor any other congressional enactment, can lower the threshold 
requirements of standing under Art. III.”  Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for 
Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 488 n.24 (1982) (first citing Gladstone, Realtors v. 
Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979); then citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)). 
165. See Roberts, supra note 164, at 1226 (explaining role Congress may play in conferring 
standing). 
166. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gladstone, Realtors, 441 U.S. at 100) (not-
ing some constitutional limitations on Congress’s ability to confer standing). 
167. See id. 
168. See Marcum, supra note 149, at 554 (noting circuit split leaves victims’ chances of remedy 
uncertain); see also Kim, supra note 25, at 551 (noting state data breach laws are not uniform). 
169. See Dowty, supra note 26, at 700. 
170. See Kim, supra note 25, at 551–55 (explaining the numerous statutes and regulations 
governing data breaches, and asserting they are confusing); see also Marcum, supra note 149, at 554 
(explaining conflicting interpretations of injury in fact result in unpredictable outcomes for plain-
tiffs). 
171. See In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1218 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
172. See Khan v. Children’s Nat’l Health Sys., 188 F. Supp. 3d 524, 533 (D. Md. 2016) (find-
ing plaintiff allegation that data breach victims were more likely to face risks of identity theft insuf-
ficient because they failed to allege hacker intent to misuse information or actual theft). 
173. See Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 653, 656–57 (S.D. Ohio 
2014), rev’d, 663 Fed. App’x 384, 389 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding no standing where plaintiffs failed to 
show injury resulting from statutory violation). 
174. See Roberts, supra note 164, at 1226 (explaining Congress may not confer standing to 
plaintiffs by statute where they cannot show Article III standing). 
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the absence of Article III injury, leaving plaintiffs unable to hold the companies who 
are responsible for maintaining their sensitive data accountable.175 
Further, the Supreme Court in Spokeo, Inc. held that a statute could not confer 
Article III standing without a cognizable injury even where there was a technical 
statutory violation.176  The Court rejected the contention that a violation of the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act conferred standing where information, the veracity of which 
was protected by the Act, was reported incorrectly because of a procedural viola-
tion.177  The Court reiterated that concrete injury is required by Article III and a 
statutory violation alone is not enough.178  Therefore, plaintiffs may not “allege a 
bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm, and satisfy the injury-
in-fact requirement of Article III.”179  However, the Court acknowledged that a risk 
of real harm may still satisfy the concreteness requirement for injury.180 
The Court noted that the circuit court below did not adequately examine 
whether an Article III injury resulted from the procedural violation.181  This shows 
that a plaintiff’s ability to sue depends on whether the plaintiff can allege sufficient 
injury even where there may be a procedural violation of a statute.  Therefore, courts 
should recognize an increased risk of identity theft as sufficient risk to show injury 
in data breach cases because in many courts, a statutory violation alone leaves plain-
tiffs unable to reach the merits of their claims against companies responsible for the 
safekeeping of personal information.182 
VI. THE LASTING IMPACT OF IN RE U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 
DATA SECURITY BREACH LITIGATION 
The FBI reports as many as 900 complaints of cybercrime each day.183  Data 
breaches continue to impact billions of individuals each year and cost millions to 
rectify.184  Moreover, data breaches are extremely expensive.185  These costs include 
 
175. See id. (noting statute may not provide standing where no injury exists); see also Kim, 
supra note 25, at 581 (explaining why standing may hold companies accountable for failure to pro-
tect information). 
176. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016). 
177. See id. at 1546. 
178. See id. at 1549 (explaining constitutional requirements of Article III standing still control 
even where statute is violated). 
179. See id. at 1549–50 (citing Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009) (noting 
plaintiff’s allegations do not comport with Article III standing requirements). 
180. See id. at 1549. 
181. See id. at 1550 (explaining circuit court’s shortcomings in determining whether Article 
III standing requirements were satisfied). 
182. See Dowty, supra note 26, at 700.  For a further discussion of courts failing to find injury 
in data breach cases, see supra Section II.C. 
183. See Report Shows Cyber-Enabled Crimes and Costs Rose in 2018, supra note 11 (explaining 
frequency of cybercrimes). 
184. See Snider, supra note 28. 
185. See Christina Cardoza, Report: The Costs of Data Breaches Are Rising, SD TIMES (July 24, 
2019), https://sdtimes.com/security/report-the-cost-of-data-breaches-are-rising/ 
[https://perma.cc/3KNX-HXTW] (explaining recent trends in data breach impact).  The cost of 
data breaches increased 12% from 2014 to 2019.  Id.  As of 2019, each breach cost an average of 
$3.92 million.  Id. 
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 6 [2020], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol65/iss6/2
2020] NOTE 45 
identity theft and tax fraud.186  As a result of a data breach, victims often can be 
negatively impacted for years, or even decades.187  Crucially, there are many instances 
where a victim of identity theft will not know of the damage they have suffered until 
a loan or credit card application is denied years later.188 
Currently, the District of Columbia Circuit is one among only a handful of cir-
cuits willing to grant standing where the injury alleged is based on the increased risk 
of future identity theft.189  Plaintiffs who had their personal information compro-
mised in a data breach and face an increased risk of identity theft may only bring 
their claims in some areas of the country.190  The District of Columbia Circuit’s 
opinion, however, supports a necessary step in the way courts treat injury in fact in 
data breach litigation.191  In re OPM Litigation recognized that courts can interpret the 
standing doctrine to recognize injuries faced by data breach victims while comport-
ing with Supreme Court precedent.192  If other courts do not adopt this approach, 
government and organizational security practices are less likely to change because 
they have less incentive to better protect against breaches.193 
 
186. See Data Breach: Tax-Related Information for Taxpayers, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/identity-
theft-fraud-scams/data-breach-information-for-taxpayers [https://perma.cc/Q5JT-L2NE] (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2020) (discussing relationship data breaches can have to tax-related identity theft); 
see also Hsu, supra note 2 (discussing impact of identity theft resulting from data breaches). 
187. See Andrew Soergel, Equifax Data Breach Could Have ‘Decades of Impact’, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 
8, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2017-09-08/equifax-breach-could-have-dec-
ades-of-impact-on-consumers [https://perma.cc/429F-9GR6] (explaining impact data breaches 
may have on affected consumers). 
188. See Identity Theft Protection, MICH. DEPT. OF ATT’Y GEN., https://www.michi-
gan.gov/ag/0,4534,7-359-81903_20942-455904—,00.html [https://perma.cc/V8M3-PR5U] (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2019) (noting many victims not aware of identity theft until years later). 
189. See, e.g., In re U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 928 F.3d 42, 59 (D.C. 
Cir. 2019) (finding plaintiffs’ risk of future injury satisfied standing requirements); Attias v. Care-
First, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 629–630 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (finding sufficient injury to satisfy standing 
where victims alleged facts supporting inference of increased risk of future fraud); Galaria v. Na-
tionwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 Fed. App’x 384, 389 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding plaintiffs alleged injury for 
standing where data was clearly stolen with criminal intent of fraud). 
190. See, e.g., Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 274 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding requirements for 
standing were not met when plaintiffs could not show their information was misused, noting an 
increased risk of theft was speculative); Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(finding any alleged future injury was speculative, and therefore insufficient for Article III standing); 
see also Marcum, supra note 149, at 554 (explaining standing analysis’s conflicting interpretations of 
injury in fact lead to unpredictable data breach litigation results). 
191. See Lorio, supra note 13, at 128 (explaining failure of courts to find “injury suitable [for] 
judicial resolution” when plaintiffs allege risk of future injury); see also Kim, supra note 25, at 550 
(recognizing failure of courts to remedy victims’ data breach claims). 
192. Compare Galbraith, supra note 29, at 1375–77 (summarizing history and development of 
traditional standing doctrine), with Joseph F. Yenouskas & Levi W. Swank, Emerging Legal Issues in 
Data Breach Class Actions, BUS. L. TODAY (July 17, 2018), https://businesslawto-
day.org/2018/07/emerging-legal-issues-data-breach-class-actions/ [Permalink unavailable] (ex-
plaining data breach standing as new and evolving area of law pushing limits of standing doctrine). 
193. See Marcum, supra note 149, at 555 (discussing impact of failing to allow plaintiffs alleg-
ing an increased risk of future identity theft to bring claims).  Further, it is unlikely that allowing 
data breach plaintiffs alleging a risk of future harm to proceed will produce an influx of litigation if 
courts adhere to Spokeo Inc.’s guidance and limit standing to those who can show a concrete risk of 
harm.  See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).  For a further discussion of concrete 
injury for standing purposes, see supra Section V.A. 
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